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Some acts that accord with duty have what philosophers call moral worth. These acts 
manifest the agent’s virtuous motives and, thus, do her credit. More precisely, an act 
that accords with duty has moral worth if and only if the agent’s reason for performing 
it is the same as what would have motivated a perfectly virtuous agent to perform it. To 
illustrate, suppose that I’ve rescued a drowning child. This, we’ll assume, was my duty. 
Nevertheless, my act needn’t have moral worth. For if my only reason for rescuing the 
child was that I anticipated receiving a reward, it won’t. After all, this is not what would 
have motivated a perfectly virtuous agent. 
What, then, must an agent’s reason for rescuing a child be for it to have moral 
worth? On one popular view (call it the rightness view), an act that accords with duty has 
moral worth if and only if the agent’s reason for performing it is the fact that it is 
right/obligatory.1 On this view, what would motivate a perfectly virtuous agent to 
rescue a drowning child is the fact that doing so is obligatory, which is what Immanuel 
Kant (1QRS) calls the motive of duty. However, many find this view implausible. For one, 
the motive of duty seems to involve one thought too many. After all, it would, as 
Michael Stocker has pointed out (12QW: .W-), be disturbing to learn that the agent was 
motivated out of a concern to do her duty rather than out of a concern for the child (see 
                                               
1 Zoë Johnson King (-01R) calls the only-if portion of this bi-conditional the “KANTIAN VIEW: Someone 
performs an action with moral worth only if she is motivated to do the right thing by the very fact that it is 
right.” And she considers both herself and Paulina Sliwa (-01W) to be proponents of this view.  
2 
also Williams 12R1: 1R). For another, an agent whose primary motive for rescuing a child 
is a concern for doing her duty seems to have a moral fetish. For, as Michael Smith has 
noted, “good people care non-derivatively about honesty, the weal and woe of their 
children and friends, the well-being of their fellows, people geaing what they deserve, 
justice, equality, and the like, not just one thing: doing what they believe to be right, 
where this is read de dicto and not de re” (122.: QS). And although many proponents of 
the rightness view have been left unconvinced by these two worries (e.g., Johnson King 
-01R), they have led others to accept instead the right-making view. On this view, an act 
that accords with duty has moral worth if and only if the agent’s reason for performing 
it is the fact that it has feature F, where F is that feature of obligatory acts that makes 
them obligatory.2 Thus, the right-making view holds that a perfectly virtuous agent 
would be motivated to rescue a drowning child, not because doing so is obligatory, but 
because doing so has feature F, where F is that feature of obligatory acts that makes 
them obligatory. For instance, if act-utilitarianism is correct, then the right-making view 
holds that a perfectly virtuous agent would be motivated to rescue a drowning child 
because doing so would “optimize” utility.3  
Both views are, I believe, incorrect, and I’ll provide counterexamples to prove it. 
These counterexamples will also suggest that we should instead accept the what-ma7ers 
view. On this view, an act that accords with duty has moral worth if and only if the 
agent’s reason for performing it is the fact that p, where performing this act in response 
to the fact that p is the correct response to appropriately valuing the things that 
ultimately maaer. On this view, a perfectly virtuous agent would be motivated to rescue 
the drowning child out of concern for the things that ultimately maaer. That is, a 
perfectly virtuous agent would rescue the child in response, perhaps, to the fact both 
                                               
2 Johnson King (-01R) calls the only-if portion of this bi-conditional the “NEW VIEW: Someone performs an 
action with moral worth if she is motivated to do the right thing by the features that make it right (the ‘right-
making features’).” And she considers both Nomy Arpaly (-00-) and Julia Markovits (-010) to be 
proponents of this view.  
3 I’ll be using the word ‘optimize’ as a technical term such that an available act optimizes utility if and only if 
it would produce more utility than any available alternative would. By contrast, an available act maximizes 
utility if and only if there is no available alternative that would produce more utility than it would.   
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that the child would die if not rescued and that no one would be harmed if she were 
rescued, where rescuing her in response to this fact is the correct response to 
appropriately valuing the things that ultimately maaer, which are (let’s assume) the 
child and everyone else.  
 
!. The Two Leading Views about Moral Worth and Why Each Fails 
In the literature, philosophers have tended to focus on only two views concerning moral 
worth. The first originates with Kant (1QRS) and is what I’ve called the rightness view. 
On this view, virtuous motivation consists in an ultimate concern for doing what’s 
right/obligatory (read de dicto and not de re). Paulina Sliwa commits herself to this view 
in holding that “a morally right action [that is, an act that accords with duty] has moral 
worth if and only if it is motivated by concern for doing what’s right” (-01W: k2.). As 
previously noted, though, many find this view implausible as it seems to involve both 
one thought too many and a fetishistic concern for the rightness of one’s acts. As a result, 
these critics have tended to accept the right-making view instead. On the right-making 
view, virtuous motivation consists in an ultimate concern for performing acts that have 
feature F, where F is that feature of obligatory acts that makes them obligatory. On this 
view, the “morally good person is moved directly by wrong-making [or right-making] 
features of the wrongful [or the obligatory] act, rather than by the fact that the act would 
be wrong [or obligatory]; the former and not the laaer are the good person’s reasons for 
acting as she does” (Darwall -010: 1kW).   
 To see why I reject both views, consider the following two counterexamples.4 And 
let ‘F’ be a placeholder for whatever it is that makes obligatory acts obligatory. Thus, if 
act-utilitarianism is correct, then ‘has feature F’ stands for ‘optimizes utility’. But if 
Kantianism is correct, then ‘has feature F’ stands for ‘is the only act that accords with the 
Categorical Imperative’. And if some other criterion of rightness is correct, then ‘feature 
                                               
4 These are adapted from David Estlund’s case entitled Slice and Patch Go Golfing (-01Q: Sk), which in turn 
was adapted from Donald Regan’s case of Whiff and Poof—see his 12R0. But neither use this sort of example 
to test our intuitions about moral worth. 
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F’ stands for whatever this criterion specifies as being the right-making feature of 
actions.   
 
Golfing for Rightness’ Sake: Unless a patient’s tumour is removed this afternoon, 
he’ll die (though not painfully). Cuaing and stitching this afternoon by the only two 
available doctors, Slice and Patch, is the only thing that can save him. For Slice is the 
only one who can do the cuaing, and Patch is the only one who can do the stitching. 
If there is either cuaing without stitching or stitching without cuaing, the patient’s 
death will be physically agonizing. It would even be cruel for one of the doctors to 
show up to the hospital knowing that the other won’t, as this would only needlessly 
get the patient’s hopes up, making his death psychologically agonizing. 
Unfortunately, both Slice and Patch are bad people who want their patient to die. 
Consequently, each has decided to take their own husband golfing regardless of 
what she thinks the other might do. And each knows this about the other. Thus, 
each knows that, given the other’s unwillingness to do her part in saving the 
patient, taking one’s own husband golfing has feature F and is, therefore, what one 
is obligated to do. For let’s assume that, given the unwillingness of the other, the 
best thing that either of them can do is to take their own husband golfing. Now, 
neither doctor has any concern for anyone but herself, but each has a concern for 
doing what’s obligatory (read de dicto and not de re). Of course, this desire is not as 
strong as each’s desire to see to it that their patient dies, which is what explains why 
neither is willing to do her part in saving the patient. So, in the end, each doctor 
takes her husband golfing out of a concern to do what’s obligatory. Thus, of the four 
collectively available outcomes, they together produce what I’ve labelled O.. See 
Table 1.  
Golfing for F’s Sake: This example is exactly the same as the one above except that 
in this example each doctor has a concern, not for doing what’s obligatory, but for 
doing what has feature F.  
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[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE – IT CURRENTLY APPEARS AFTER THE REFERENCES]  
 
I assume that, given the other’s unwillingness to do her part, each doctor is 
obligated to take her husband golfing. And this, I believe, is a safe assumption. For, 
given Patch’s unwillingness to cooperate, Slice’s showing up to the hospital has no 
chance of saving the patient and every chance of making the patient’s death agonizing. 
Likewise, given Slice’s unwillingness to cooperate, Patch’s showing up to the hospital 
has no chance of saving the patient and every chance of making the patient’s death 
agonizing. So, given their circumstances, each doctor should stay away from the 
hospital. And let me just stipulate that each doctor has promised to take her husband 
golfing, that each can optimize utility only by doing so, and that, given that each has 
every reason to stay away from the hospital, the best thing that each of them can do, 
under the circumstances, is to take their own husband golfing. Of course, many non-
maximizing theories would deny that an agent must always perform her best option. 
But every plausible theory (maximizing or non-maximizing) will require an agent to 
perform her best option when she has promised to do so and doing so would optimize 
utility. So, it seems safe to assume that, on any plausible criterion of rightness, F will be 
such that each doctor is, in both cases, obligated take her husband golfing.  
To see why these are counterexamples, consider first that the rightness view implies 
that, in Golfing for Rightness’ Sake, each doctor’s act of taking her husband golfing has 
moral worth, for each doctor’s reason for taking her husband golfing is that doing so is 
obligatory. And consider second that the right-making view implies that, in Golfing for 
F’s Sake, each doctor’s act of taking her husband golfing has moral worth, for each 
doctor’s reason for taking her husband golfing is that doing so has feature F, which is, 
we’re assuming, what makes obligatory acts obligatory. But it seems that, in both cases, 
it’s just an accident that each doctor does the right thing. For, in both cases, each doctor’s 
motives were such that they were going to take their own husband golfing regardless of 
what the other was willing to do, and doing this would have been wrong had the other 
been willing do her part in saving the patient. So, each just lucked out in that the other 
doctor was unwilling to do her part. For had the other doctor been willing to do her 
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part, she would have acted wrongly. Now, the one thing that all parties to the debate 
agree on is that an act that is just accidentally right cannot have moral worth (Arpaly 
-00-: -k0, Johnson King -01R, Markovits -010: -0W, and Sliwa -01W: W). So, all parties 
should agree that neither the rightness view nor the right-making view is correct given 
that both views imply that an act that is just accidentally right can have moral worth.   
 So, we need to look for a different view. Consider, then, why it was just an accident 
that each doctor acted rightly in the above two cases. It was, it seems, because neither 
doctor cared about something that ultimately maaered: namely, their patient. Had they 
each cared appropriately for their patient, each would have been willing to do her part 
in saving him. And, in that case, each would have had motives that guaranteed that each 
does her part in any situation in which the other doctor is willing to do hers. So, these 
examples suggest that virtuous motivation consists in one’s fundamentally valuing the 
things that ultimately maaer, valuing them in the right way (by, say, respecting them 
and/or wanting to promote their utility), and valuing them to the extent to which they 
each merit being valued. This is what I’ve called the what-maaers view, which I will 
now develop.    
 
D. The What-MaFers View 
What ultimately maaers is just whatever it is that we should ultimately value and/or 
care about. Perhaps, what ultimately maaers are people, sentient beings, or their 
utilities. But the properties of our actions don’t ultimately maaer. If an agent cares about 
whether her act has, say, the property of being obligatory or the property of having that 
feature that makes it obligatory, it should be only because she must perform such an act 
so as to respond appropriately to the things that ultimately maaer. So, an agent’s 
concern for the rightness or the right-making features of her actions should be entirely 
derivative of her concern for the things that ultimately maaer.  
It’s important to realize, then, that a criterion of rightness doesn’t specify the things 
that ultimately maaer, but only the features of obligatory acts that make them 
obligatory. To see this, it will be helpful to consider three moral theories, starting with 
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act-utilitarianism. On act-utilitarianism, what makes an act obligatory is that it optimizes 
utility. But acts that optimize utility are not among the things that ultimately maaer. If 
they were, act-utilitarians wouldn’t care which of O1 or O. Slice and Patch produce, but 
only that they produce one or the other. For so long as they produce either O1 or O., they 
each perform acts that optimize utility.5 Yet, those sympathetic to consequentialism 
generally and, I believe, rightly find it problematic that this theory fails to require Slice 
and Patch to produce the best outcome that they could together produce: namely, O1.6 
And the reason it’s problematic is that what ultimately maaers is not that each agent 
performs utility-optimizing acts, but that the best outcome that they could together 
produce obtains. So, we should think that the things that ultimately maaer are not 
utility-optimizing acts, but, perhaps, people and/or their utilities. And, perhaps, the 
appropriate way to value such things is to prefer larger to smaller quantities of utility 
and, thus, to prefer O1 to O.. This would, then, explain why act-utilitarianism’s 
implications in cases like the above are problematic.  
Next, consider rule-utilitarianism. On rule-utilitarianism, what makes an act 
obligatory is that it is required by the ideal code of rules, the code of rules whose 
internalization by the vast majority of everyone everywhere would optimize utility. But, 
the rule-utilitarian shouldn’t hold that what ultimately maaers is utility. For if she did, 
she would have an overarching commitment to maximizing utility. And such a 
commitment would make rule-utilitarianism incoherent. For rule-utilitarianism directs 
us to follow the ideal code even when we know that doing so would not maximize 
utility. And such a directive would render any theory with an overarching commitment 
to maximizing utility incoherent (Hooker -000: 22–10-). Thus, rule-utilitarians should 
instead hold that what ultimately maaers are people. For, in that case, they can defend 
rule-utilitarianism by appealing instead to an overarching commitment to people. They 
could, then, hold that we appropriately value people only by respecting them and that 
                                               
5 Slice and Patch will each optimize aggregate happiness so long as they each act as the other does—that is, 
so long as they either each go golfing or each do their parts in the surgery.  
6 See, for instance, Regan 12R0.  
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we adequately respect them only by ensuring that we ‘behave in ways that are 
impartially defensible’, which, the rule-utilitarian will argue, requires us to act in 
accordance with the ideal code (Hooker -000: 10-). And if the rule-utilitarian eschews an 
overarching commitment to maximizing utility in order to instead adopt an overarching 
commitment to respecting people by treating them in ways that are impartially 
defensible, there will be nothing incoherent in their insisting that we follow the rules 
even when we know that doing so won’t maximize utility.  
Finally, consider Rossian pluralism. On this view, what makes an act wrong is that 
it violates the weighted balance of one’s prima facie duties (Ross 12k0). But it’s 
implausible to think that what Rossians ultimately care about is whether agents perform 
such acts. It’s more plausible to suppose that what they ultimately care about are the 
things that these prima facie duties safeguard: fidelity, justice, reparation, gratitude, 
beneficence, non-maleficence, and self-improvement. So, again, we see that what 
ultimately maaers isn’t that one’s acts are right or even that they have whatever feature 
it is that makes them right, but instead things like fidelity, justice, happiness, or people.  
Given that the things that ultimately maaer are not the rightness or the right-
making features of actions, the only way to ensure that an agent who acts in accordance 
with duty does what’s right for the right reason rather than accidentally is to insist that 
she does so out of an appropriate concern for the things that ultimately maaer. And this 
is why I’ve claimed that virtuous motivation consists in one’s valuing the things that 
ultimately maaer, valuing them in the right way, and valuing them to the exact extent to 
which they merit being valued. Given this, we should think that an act that accords with 
duty has moral worth if and only if the agent’s reason for performing it is the fact that p, 
where performing this act in response to the fact that p is the correct response to 
appropriately valuing the things that ultimately maaer. Thus, we should accept the 
what-maaers view.7  
                                               
7 I admit that both Arpaly (-00-) and Markovits (-010) may count as proponents of the what-maaers view. 
But it’s unclear. Both talk about moral worth being a maaer of the agent’s performing the act for “the 
reasons morally justifying the action” (Markovits -010: -0S)—that is, for “the reasons making it right” 
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G. Huckleberry Finn 
To beaer understand the what-maaers view, it will be helpful to consider what is 
perhaps the most central case from the relevant literature: that of Huckleberry Finn. For 
it is useful to compare and contrast the implications of the three views that we’ve been 
discussing with respect to this case. I’ll begin, then, with Arpaly’s helpful description of 
the case.  
 
In Mark Twain’s The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Huckleberry befriends Jim and helps him 
escape from slavery. While Huckleberry and Jim are together on their raft, Huckleberry is 
plagued by what he calls ‘conscience’. He believes, as everyone in his society ‘knows’, that 
helping a slave escape amounts to stealing, and stealing is wrong. He also believes that one 
should be helpful and loyal to one’s friends, but loyalty to friends is outweighed by some things, 
such as property rights, and does Miss Watson, Jim’s owner, not have property rights? Hoping to 
find some excuse not to turn Jim in, Huckleberry deliberates. He is not very good at abstract 
deliberation, and it never occurs to him to doubt what his society considers common sense. Thus, 
he fails to find a loophole. ‘What has poor Miss Watson done to me’, he berates himself, ‘that I 
can see her nigger go away and say nothing at all?’ Having thus deliberated, Huckleberry 
resolves to turn Jim in, because it is ‘the right thing’. But along comes a perfect opportunity, and 
he finds himself psychologically unable to do it. (-00-: --R) 
 
 Let’s assume that what motivates Finn to help Jim to elude the authorities is that 
Finn has come to see Jim as a fellow human being and, consequently, can’t stand the 
thought of his losing his newly-found freedom. And let’s assume that what justifies Finn 
in helping Jim to elude the authorities is the fact that Jim is a fellow human being who 
would lose his freedom if caught by the authorities. Given these assumptions, the right-
making view implies that Finn’s act has moral worth. But, given that he wasn’t 
                                               
(Arpaly -00-: --W). But people like Johnson King (-01R) interpret them as thereby referring to the right-
making features of the action. Now, I’m less clear on whether this is what they intend to be referring to. 
Nevertheless, my hope is that this paper will clarify that there are three, not two, main views that need to be 
kept distinct and evaluated. Thus, when people like Johnson King (-01R) point to problems with the right-
making view, they haven’t thereby shown that there are any problems with the what-maaers view. And 
people like Arpaly and Markovits need to be clearer on whether they accept the right-making view or the 
what-maaers view. 
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motivated by the rightness of his helping Jim to elude the authorities (indeed, he 
believed this to be wrong), the rightness view implies Finn’s act lacked moral worth.  
Now, I think that neither view is correct, for, contrary to what both views suppose, 
we don’t yet have enough information to determine whether Finn’s act has moral worth. 
For suppose that Finn’s concern for Jim’s keeping his freedom is so great that he would 
be willing to help Jim elude the authorities even if he knew that Jim was planning on 
killing several white children in retaliation for his previous enslavement. In that case, it 
was just an accident that his motives led him to do the right thing in his actual situation. 
For his motives would have led him to do the wrong thing had the situation been one in 
which Jim was planning on going on a murderous rampage. Thus, it seems that for us to 
determine whether Finn’s act has moral worth, we need to know more than just whether 
he was motivated by the fact that Jim is a fellow human being who would lose his 
freedom if caught by the authorities.8 We also need to know whether Finn appropriately 
values all the things that ultimately maaer. Thus, we need to know whether he 
appropriately values all those who could potentially be affected by Jim’s going free. And 
Finn doesn’t if he would be willing to help Jim elude the authorities even if Jim were 
planning on going on a murderous rampage.  
So, it seems that neither the rightness view nor the right-making view gets the 
correct answer in this case. For the correct answer is not that Finn’s act lacks moral 
worth given that Finn’s reason for helping Jim was not that doing so was right, nor is it 
that Finn’s act has moral worth given that his reason for helping Jim was the fact that 
justified his act: the fact that Jim is a fellow human being who will lose his freedom if not 
so helped. Rather, the correct answer is that Jim’s act has moral worth if and only if his 
reason for helping Jim was, say, the fact that this would be the only way for him to 
                                               
8 Johnson King (-01R) also presses this sort of objection against the right-making view.  
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adequately express his respect for all those involved.9 Thus, it is the what-maaers view 
that provides the correct account of moral worth.  
 
I. Conclusion 
The distinction between the right-making features of acts and the things that ultimately 
maaer is an important, but often overlooked, distinction. First, it can help us to explain 
why those originally sympathetic to act-utilitarianism became dissatisfied with the 
theory when it was shown not to guarantee that those who satisfy it will collectively 
produce the best outcome that they could together produce. Second, it can be employed 
by rule-utilitarians in explaining how they can avoid the incoherence objection. And, 
third, it can, as I’ve shown here, help us to beaer understand what virtuous motivation 
consists in. I’ve argued that it consists in valuing the things that ultimately maaer, 
valuing them in the right way, and valuing them to the exact extent to which they merit 
being valued. Thus, I’ve concluded that we should reject both the rightness view and the 
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 Slice cuts Slice golfs with her husband 
Patch 
s5tches 
(O$) The best world that they 
could together produce: the 
pa8ent lives and both 
husbands are disappointed not 
to go golfing. Each op8mizes 
u8lity. 
 
(OA) Tied for the worst world 
that they could together 
produce: the pa8ent dies in 
agony, Patch’s husband is 
disappointed not to go golfing, 







(OG) Tied for the worst world 
that they could together 
produce: the pa8ent dies in 
agony, Slice’s husband is 
disappointed not to go golfing, 
but Patch’s husband is glad to 
go golfing. 
  
(OH) The second-best world 
that they could together 
produce: the pa8ent dies 
painlessly and both husbands 
are glad to go golfing. Each 
op8mizes u8lity. 
